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1. Introduction 
 
The transformation of enterprises is a major managerial challenge, especially in firms with a 
rigid organisational culture and outdated resources and routines. Transformation requires 
upgrading of resources by acquisition of articulable and tacit knowledge  (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). Articulable knowledge can be codified and is thus more easily transferred.  However 
tacit knowledge is often embedded in uncoded routines and in the firm’s social context  
(Kogut and Zander, 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).  Hence transformation requires 
organisational learning (OL), involving the acquisition, internalisation and dissemination of 
both types of knowledge in the organisation (Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 1990; Staples, 
Greenaway and McKeen, 2001). These processes require related prior knowledge, such that 
new information can be interpreted and related to the context of the organisation. In other 
words, OL depends on the organisation’s absorptive capacity -  its ability  to value, assimilate 
and apply new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
 
OL can be studied particularly well in the context of transition economies, which provide a 
societal quasi-experiment for testing and developing theories by engaging them in an unusual 
and changing context (Meyer and Peng, 2005). The pace and extent of change provides 
opportunities for qualitative processual research investigating critical junctures in the 
evolution of business  (Meyer and Gelbuda, 2006), such as the interaction of environmental 
change with OL.  
 
In transition economies, absorptive capacity has typically been weak, in part because related 
managerial knowledge was not in place and existing routines became dysfunctional in the 
new context (Newman, 2000). Some firms have successfully transformed themselves, yet 
many privatised (formerly state-owned) enterprises have failed to change (Uhlenbruck, 
Meyer and Hitt, 2003). The biggest gap was experienced by Russian companies because 
seventy years in a planned economy have limited their exposure to competition and 
innovation. However, the organisational transformation in the Russian oil industry from the 
mid 1990s onwards has been rapid and significant, with the largest Russian oil companies 
beginning to compare themselves with the Western oil majors (Khartukov, 2001; Grace, 
2005) and others continuing to operate virtually unchanged.  
 
On the basis of qualitative longitudinal case studies of four privatised Russian oil companies 
we analyse how and why the process of OL and the development of organisational capability 
varies between firms in the same industry. Choosing a period of rapid change allowed us to 
conduct processual analysis of change (Pettigrew, 1997; Dawson, 2003) over a relatively 
short period of time.  
 
We find that OL is highly relevant for explaining the process of development of 
organisational capability in transition economies. The combination of the concepts of 
breaking with administrative heritage, absorptive capacity and exploitation and exploration 
learning enhances our understanding of how organisations in transition economies can 
transform.  Furthermore the pressure cooker effect of a heightened pace of change, driven by 
upheaval in the external environment and the intervention of top managers, enables key 
insights about how large, conservative and bureaucratic companies in the West, anchored in 
their own administrative heritage, may achieve rapid change. Our research points to a pivotal 
role of top management teams (TMT) in OL. We explain how the characteristics of the TMT 
critically influence OL at different stages of the process and we develop a conceptual 
framework for OL to help organisations to achieve fundamental change.  
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In the next section we review the challenges for OL identified in the literature on enterprise 
transformation in transition economies. On the basis of the literature and our grounded case 
studies we introduce our theoretical framework for organisational learning and the 
development of organisational capability. The methodology is explained and then the case 
study findings are used to elaborate the framework.  The discussion develops key insights 
from the cross-case analysis and we conclude by considering the relevance of the framework 
for other change contexts and suggest some avenues for further research.  
 
2. Organisational learning in transition economies 
 
For an organisation to learn, it must have the ability to reconstruct and adapt its knowledge 
base, in so doing, having the ability to creatively destroy outmoded practices and attitudes 
(Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). These basic abilities, also known as absorptive capacity, were 
not available in many firms in transition economies as a result of their administrative heritage. 
They were organised fundamentally differently and had to change even the inner logic from 
plan target fulfilment to profitability and efficiency  (Meyer and Møller, 1998; Newman, 
2000). 
 
2.1 Absorptive capacity  
 
OL analyses learning and adaptation at the organisational level (Shrivastava, 1983) and is 
necessary for organisations to adapt their capabilities (Dosi et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Pisano, 2000). What an organisation knows how to do today is a function of 
what was learned yesterday (Pisano 2000). Its ability to build new strategic capabilities 
depends on its administrative heritage: its existing organisational attributes, its configuration 
of assets and capabilities, its distribution of managerial responsibilities and influence, and its 
ongoing set of relationships (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Thus, OL is conditioned by the 
prior structure and culture of the organisation, in particular its ability to assimilate and apply 
new knowledge. This absorptive capacity is a function of prior learning and a set of learning 
skills provided by similar learning experiences (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
 
The general educational level in the transition economies is relatively high, suggesting that 
absorptive capacity might be high. However, complex organisational and technological skills, 
which would enable persons to apply their knowledge in a different context, are weak (Swaan, 
1997). These capabilities involve tacit knowledge, which is often team-embedded and 
requires complex learning processes to be effective. New systems and procedures have to be 
adopted and the learner not only has to unlearn acquired routines and replace them with new 
ones, but also to reassess attitudes and value systems underlying behaviour under the old and 
new regimes (Lyles and Salk, 1996; Meyer and Møller, 1998; Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001). 
Thus, the knowledge gap concerns skills that can only be partially transferred through active 
interaction between teacher and recipient and require intensive learning by doing.   
 
Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle and Borza (2000) show that emerging market firms search for 
partners from whom they can learn managerial and technical capabilities. However, even in 
an equity alliance it is a major challenge to acquire  tacit components of partners’ capabilities 
(Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Many firms in transition economies do not have learning 
experiences similar to those of potential partners operating in a market economy (Hitt et al., 
2000) and the cognitive ability of managers and employees to envisage major change and to 
identify and implement radically different routines is limited (Lyles and Salk, 1996; Newman, 
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2000; Lane et al., 2001). Therefore, absorptive capacity is weak, even if firms closely 
cooperate with Western partners. The origins of this weakness are grounded in the 
administrative heritage of the firms. 
 
2.2 Administrative heritage 
 
The planned economy endowed firms with resources that were profoundly different from the 
requirements for effectiveness in a market economy (Newman, 2000; Peng, 2000; Meyer, 
2001). For firms in transition economies, the administrative heritage is a liability because the 
inherited routines apply to an economic system that is no longer operational. The inertial 
nature of inherited resources is reinforced by cultural traits in Russian culture that inhibit 
change and knowledge sharing. Socialist societies discouraged experimentation, innovation 
and organisational change (Kornai, 1992; Kogut and Zander, 2000). In particular, Russian 
managers typically do not share knowledge but accumulate it as a source of individual power 
rather than treating it as a corporate resource (Vlachoutsicos and Lawrence, 1996). For 
instance, Husted and Michailova, (2002) find that knowledge transmission, even in Russian 
firms with foreign ownership, is constrained by lack of incentives for sharing knowledge, a 
departmental way of thinking and acting, and fear of mistakes. The Soviet legacy of fear of 
misinterpretation further constrains knowledge sharing.  These problems are magnified by the 
geographic spread of some organisational networks over distant regions (Peng, 2000). 
 
Organisational cultures that inhibit knowledge sharing would also inhibit OL, and cement 
existing routines. Thus the inherited resources, structures and cultures would reinforce each 
other, and weaken the organisation’s absorptive capacity. This administrative heritage has to 
be overcome to initiate OL processes.  
 
2.3 Exploitation and exploration learning 
 
The OL literature distinguishes between exploitation and exploration learning (March, 1991). 
Exploitation comprises refinement, choice, production efficiency, selection implementation 
and execution, whilst exploration includes search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, 
play, flexibility discovery and innovation. Most organisational learning is exploitation 
learning (ie there is incremental change in routines within the existing schema) (Newman 
2000). These concepts are similar to Senge’s (1992) description of adaptive (survival) and 
generative learning.  Adaptive learning is about coping (ie exploiting). Generative learning, 
on the other hand, enhances creativity and corresponds to exploration learning. Superior 
performance is achieved by an ambidextrous organisation that simultaneously pursues both 
incremental and discontinuous change (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Therefore, 
organisations need to achieve a balance between exploitation and exploration learning (He 
and Wong, 2004). 
 
For companies in transition economies, the first emphasis has been on exploitation learning, 
since they need to acquire the operational capabilities which already exist in the West. 
However, companies also need to engage in exploration learning, typified by new and 
original thinking, because the challenges of emerging economies require new business 
models that add value in the specific context  (London and Hart, 2004; Prahalad, 2004).  
Kogut and Zander (1996) emphasise learning through experimentation and internal 
development of new routines and capabilities adapted to the specific context, rather than the 
wholesale imposition of imported routines from alliance partners.  
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3. A framework for organisational learning in transition economies 
 
On the basis of the literature and the grounded case studies presented below, we develop a 
new framework for OL in transition economies (see Figure 1). A crucial addition to the OL 
literature is the incorporation of the TMT and leadership style in the analysis of OL processes. 
Vera and Crossan (2004) identified the importance of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
TMT leadership styles and practices for OL and empirical evidence in Russia suggests that 
transformational leadership is directly and positively related to organisational performance 
(Elenkov, 2002). Various authors point to entrepreneurs or TMTs as crucial in influencing 
transformation processes in transition economies (Fey, Adaeva and Vitkovskaia, 2001; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2003; Clark and Soulsby, 2005).  Yet exactly how TMTs influence OL in 
companies in transition economies is not well understood. Our case studies provide some 
novel insights on this issue. 
 
Figure 1. A framework for organisational learning in transition economies  
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The proposed framework depicts the pivotal role of the TMT in OL processes. This role 
varies at different stages of enterprise transformation. In the first stage of transformation into 
an exploitation learning organisation, a top down approach would force a break with the 
administrative heritage. Exploitation learning leads to the development of the basic 
operational capabilities for survival in a market economy. In the second stage of 
transformation into an exploration learning organisation a more democratic leadership style 
would foster experimentation and risk taking. Exploration learning promotes the development 
of dynamic capabilities required for sustained competitive advantage.  
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4. Research setting 
 
From the data we identified four stages of development in the fifteen year period from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. External context since the collapse of the USSR 
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The ‘time of troubles’ was the chaotic period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union during which the privatisation process started. This was followed by asset-grabbing 
and the rise of the oligarchs, who have been described as men with both wealth and power 
(Hoffman, 2002). The 1998 financial crisis in Russia was the impetus for the oil companies to 
think about cost efficiencies.  This heralded the move to the market. At this stage many of the 
operational capabilities of the companies were developed. The final stage was the re-exertion 
of state influence.  The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky (CEO of Yukos) in 2003 and 
the confiscation of Yukos’ assets was the first sign of a return to the power of the state over 
the oil industry. 
 
These macro-environmental stages of development formed the backdrop to the process of OL 
in four of the Russian oil majors: Yukos, TNK (TNK-BP), Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz.  For 
simplicity we use the term ‘Soviet style’ for Surgutneftegaz and Lukoil and ‘Western style’ 
for Yukos and TNK/TNK-BP. They represent the two types of companies which emerged 
after the privatisation. All respondents across the case studies identified a clear distinction 
between the former (which have retained much of their Soviet heritage) and the latter (which 
have transformed towards a Western model). 
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5. Methodology 
 
5.1 Research design 
 
The study is based on longitudinal and cross-sectional case studies (Yin, 2003) of four 
Russian oil companies conducted over a five-year period from 2001 to 2005. Respondents 
were asked to talk about the time after privatisation (from 1995 onwards) covering a period 
of ten years. A longitudinal and qualitative approach is one most often used for research into 
organisational change (Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron, 2001; Dawson, 2003). The 
novelty and complexity of the processes in a transition economy suggested the use of an 
interpretive approach, which is appropriate where the phenomena to be investigated are 
complex and not well understood (Ritchie, 2003). The objective was to explain the process of 
OL and its influence on the development of organisational capability and to identify how and 
why the process differed between the companies. Two companies, Yukos and TNK (later 
TNK/BP), were selected on the basis that they seemed to be changing most rapidly towards a 
Western model. This permitted literal replication between the two cases (where similar 
results are predicted) (Yin, 2003). The other two companies, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, were 
demonstrating a slower pace of change and would thus permit theoretical replication, where 
different results are obtained but for predictable reasons.  
 
5.2 Data gathering 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted as it was essential to gain an in-depth knowledge 
and understanding of the organisation and its processes (Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999).  
Triangulation of source data was achieved by interviewing different management levels (top, 
senior and middle managers), representing different functions (eg strategy, public relations 
(PR), human resources (HR), finance, manufacturing and production) at two types of location 
(head office and regional subsidiaries). External experts with knowledge and experience of 
the case companies were also interviewed to gain a triangulated view of the general context 
of the industry. A total of 71 interviews were conducted in which 74 respondents were 
involved. Eight respondents had worked in two of the companies. In 2003, while the research 
was still being conducted, two important events happened: TNK merged with BP to form a 
50:50 international joint venture (JV); and the CEO of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was 
jailed for alleged tax crimes. The subsequent partial dismantling of Yukos meant that several 
employees transferred from Yukos to the new TNK-BP JV providing a good source of 
comparative data. 
 
The interviews were conducted in Russian or English, according to respondent wishes, and 
lasted around one hour. They took place mainly in Moscow but also in the regions (for 
example Siberia for oil production and European Russia for oil refining). Respondents were 
encouraged to talk freely about organisational change. The interviews were taped and 
transcribed. 
 
5.3 Data analysis 
 
The data analysis process broadly followed the recommendations of Miles and Huberman 
(1994) for data display and Strauss and Corbin (1990) for coding and was facilitated by 
computer aided qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS)–Atlas-ti.  The interviews were imported 
into Atlas-ti in the original (Russian or English), but the coding was done in English. This 
 8 
had the advantage of retaining the original nuance and enabling a mental recreation of the 
scene. Extensive use was made of Atlas-ti facilities to theorise about codes and their 
relationships, to conceptualise the data and to develop a more integrated understanding of 
events, processes and interactions in the case. 
 
6. Findings 
 
6.1 The process of organisational learning in Russian oil companies  
 
Following the model in Figure 1 the process of OL is described in three sections: the TMT 
and break with administrative heritage; exploitation learning and the development of 
operational capabilities; and exploration learning and the development of dynamic 
capabilities. Table 1 provides a cross-case comparison of the four companies in the form of a 
data display table. 
 
6.2 TMT and break with administrative heritage 
  
The characteristics of the TMTs of the Western style and Soviet style companies are quite 
distinct.  The former are characterised by an entrepreneurial orientation, a predominance of 
outsiders and heterogeneity.  The latter are largely homogenous, insiders and experienced 
only in the Soviet oil industry. The characteristics of the Western style companies correspond 
most closely to those associated with organisational change (Lawrence 1997; Clark and 
Soulsby, 2005). 
 
The managers of the Western style companies could see the need for the introduction of 
Western management techniques: ‘These people [TNK TMT]…realised that they needed to 
be thinking…West’ (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, Russian, 2004). On the other hand the 
Soviet style companies had less interest in acquiring Western capabilities: ‘[Surgutneftegaz 
and Lukoil] Simply people had always done things that way, and they were not used to doing 
things in a new way’ (Senior Manager, Russian Oil Company, Russian, 2001, trans). The 
TMTs of the Western style companies had a broader set of experiences on which to draw to 
recognise, interpret and internalise new knowledge, creating a higher absorptive capacity. 
The role of an enlightened top management was key to overcoming the lack of experience 
and knowledge of operating in a market economy.  The absorptive capacity of the TMTs was 
high, facilitating the emergence of a new dominant logic within the organisation – the 
market-oriented logic: ‘[TNK] have no history…They have no traditions…they view 
problems with a fresh approach (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, Russian, 2004, trans). 
 
The role of these TMTs was therefore akin to the one described by Cohen and Levinthal  
(1990) for conditions of rapid and uncertain change, where absorptive capacity is a function 
of the individual standing at the interface of the firm and the external environment.  By 
mediating the influences of the external environment the TMTs were thus able to circumvent 
the constraints of history, existing structure, power and politics within their organisations  
(Pettigrew, 1987; Pettigrew et al., 2001). Past experience became irrelevant and the capability 
of people to think, analyse and make decisions was fostered.   
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Table 1. Cross-case comparison of organisational learning and the development of organisational capability 
  
 Yukos TNK (TNK-BP) Lukoil Surgutneftegaz 
TMT  Heterogeneous, outsiders, young, 
inexperienced, entrepreneurial, 
Russians/Westerners 
TNK heterogeneous, outsiders,  young, 
inexperienced, entrepreneurial, Russian/ 
Westerners. BP conservatism & experience 
Homogeneous, insiders, older, oil 
industry experience, macho, Russian 
Homogeneous (one man), 
insiders, oil industry experience, 
regional conservative, Russian 
CEO/ 
Director 
Khodorkovsky – charismatic & 
entrepreneurial 
Khan/Vekselberg – TNK, financial mgrs 
Dudley – ex Amoco/BP, Western 
Alekperov – oilman/ex Ministry Bogdanov – oilman. Surgut 
career. 
Break 
Admin 
Heritage 
Replace blockers; new managers with CEO 
support; strategic alliances; training; quick 
successes; learn by mistakes; project teams; 
Incentives 
TNK: Replace blockers; new managers; 
centralised management. TNK-BP: Open 
communications; incentives; move to 
empowerment; working groups; lead by 
example. 
Attempts slowed down by fiefdoms; 
decentralised organisation and 
bureaucracy 
None 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
Stage 1: TMT drive; top-down 
management;  promote innovation versus 
experience; early successes; crisis 
stabilisation 
Stage 2: move to democratic leadership; 
empower; encourage innovation. 
Stage 1 (TNK):  TMT drive with fresh approach; 
top-down management; early successes; crisis 
stabilisation 
Stage 2 (TNK-BP): Train to think out of the box; 
empower; encourage innovation 
Little; constrained by tradition, oil 
background and pride. Few Western  
employees 
None; constrained by tradition, oil 
background and pride; Soviet 
style management with little 
knowledge of value creation; no 
Western employees 
Exploitation 
Learning 
Western expertise (technology and 
management) via alliances; expatriates; 
Russians with Western experience; visit 
Western companies; 100% training in 
Russia and abroad; learn by doing, job 
rotation, project teams, break down silos 
TNK: Western expertise (technology and 
management) via alliances; expatriates; Russians 
with Western experience; training 
TNK-BP:  Many expatriates; access to BP 
knowledge; training; mutual secondees; rotating 
regional master-classes;  learn by doing, job 
rotation, project teams, working groups 
Acquire foreign assets; few Western 
employees (none on TMT); Western 
consultants; management training;  
rotating regional meetings; cross-
functional working groups; BUT silos 
and resistance to info sharing.  
No Western employees; technical 
training in West; copy Western 
technology; no alliances; no 
acquisition of Western 
management techniques 
Operational 
Capabilities 
HR; finance; technology; production;  
marketing; corporate governance; PR & 
investor relations; planning; systematic 
business processes 
TNK: Finance; technology; production; PR; 
marketing. TNK-BP: HR; control 
systems/empowerment; knowledge mgt.; project 
mgt.;  HSE; corporate governance; systematic 
business processes 
In process of implementation: Finance; 
planning; project evaluation; business 
processes. Limited HR. Poor 
knowledge mgt and ICT 
No Western functional 
capabilities; technology based; 
Soviet style social support 
Exploration 
Learning 
Learn by mistakes; encourage innovation; 
begin to delegate decision-making 
TNK-BP - learn by doing; project teams; job 
rotation; learning by mistakes; working groups; 
change agents; encourage participation and 
innovation 
Not applicable   Not applicable 
Dynamic 
Capabilities 
Evidence of innovation in oil production In process of development – focus still on 
operational capability.  
Not applicable   Not applicable 
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The approach of the Western style companies was to break with the administrative heritage 
by using a top-down management style: ‘The buy-in in TNK was an executive order. That’s 
the Russian style, more a military style, and very much TNK style’ (Senior Manager, TNK-
BP, ex Lukoil, Russian/Western, 2004).   Managers whose views were not aligned with the 
objectives of the new TMT were replaced. (Top Manager, TNK, Western, 2001) 
 
In the Soviet style companies the managers were themselves a part of the administrative 
heritage of the oil companies. They were unable to foster the absorptive capacity of the 
organisation: ‘If that’s the type of profile you have at the top [oilmen], instilling …change is 
very difficult because even realising that … change is needed will take a lot of effort’ 
(Headhunter, Western, 2004). The managers of these companies had been successful under 
the old system and saw no need to change. Thus, the tendency of the Soviet style companies 
was to promote traditional Soviet ways, and only introduce new Western management 
concepts very slowly. 
 
6.3 Exploitation learning and the development of operational capabilities 
  
For the Western style organisations, developing the absorptive capacity of the organisation by 
breaking with the administrative heritage prepared the ground for the first stage of OL: 
exploitation learning. This involved knowledge acquisition, internalisation and dissemination 
(Staples et al., 2001). 
 
Knowledge acquisition focused on Western expertise to increase production and improve 
efficiency. The new owners had no knowledge of the oil industry and recognised the need to 
bring in expertise: ‘They just happened to have bought a goose that lays a lot of golden eggs.  
So they brought in some proper goose keepers if you want to call it that’ (Other Consultancy, 
Western, 2004). Yukos developed a strategic alliance with Schlumberger, an oilfield services 
company, which brought them competences in oil production, finance and HR.  Basic 
Western petroleum engineering principles enabled them to ‘catch a lot of low hanging fruit’ 
in terms of rapid increase in oil production (Senior Manager, TNK-BP, ex Yukos, Western, 
2004). 
 
Both TNK and Yukos hired Russians with experience of working for Western companies.  
The CEO of TNK, Simon Kukes, had experience of the US oil industry and was a former 
Soviet citizen.  In 2001 the feeling was expressed that an even stronger infusion of 
management skills was required, which could come only from Western equity participation 
(Senior Manager, TNK, Western, 2001). This was to occur when in 2003 the TNK/BP joint 
venture was created.  The availability of secondees from BP in TNK-BP and the possibility to 
second Russian managers to BP was a major competitive advantage.   
 
Training was important in both Western styles companies: ‘Right from the beginning, 
Khodorkovsky [CEO of Yukos] set the target – 100% training’ (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, 
ex Yukos, Russian, 2005, trans.). Khodorkovsky did everything to encourage employees to 
exploit Western management practices: ‘When we looked at all the Western methods we 
selected the best, and also the ones which could be implemented in the company’ (Middle 
Manager, TNK-BP, ex Yukos, Russian, 2004, trans.). Yukos maintained relationships with 
leading Western business schools. A leadership program was developed in alliance with IMD, 
a Swiss business school.  There were technical training programs for hundreds of specialists 
in the regions.  A Masters program in petroleum engineering co-organised by Heriot Watt 
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University was set up in Tomsk, Siberia. The young specialists graduating from this course, 
the so-called ‘Heriot Watters’, completed their training in the Yukos technical centre in 
Moscow and were then sent out to the regions in senior positions. On the collapse of Yukos 
many of these young managers were recruited by TNK-BP: ‘We’ve hired a lot of the 
graduates from Yukos now because from that program they’re good’ (Top Manager, TNK-BP, 
Western, 2004). 
 
In TNK-BP there was less training than in Yukos (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, ex Yukos, 
Russian, 2004, trans.). Training programs, for example in project management, were 
commissioned from Western companies, utilising BP expertise. Detailed training programs 
were developed for high fliers in the regions and formalised in a dual language booklet.  
 
Surgutneftegaz had little interest in learning about Western management techniques.   They 
employed no expatriates and did not utilise Western oil service companies.  However, they 
did send their specialists to the US to learn about technology, then developed a ‘me too’ 
version themselves.  
 
Lukoil engaged in both the acquisition of technology and of Western management techniques. 
Of all the Russian oil companies Lukoil was the most active internationally and 20% of their 
assets were located abroad. In 2001 they acquired the Getty Oil gasoline stations in the USA 
in order to gain experience of business in the West. However they did not perceive the need to 
employ expatriates: ‘To be honest I just don’t understand what they are doing in Yukos and 
TNK, when the top managers are foreigners… I do not approve of this’ (Senior Manager, 
Lukoil, Russian, 2004, trans.). 
 
However, it was recognised that some of the Russian managers were too fixed in their ways 
to change and needed to be replaced: ‘It is not always easy to move them onto the track of 
market thinking. It is necessary to gradually replace them with new managers’ (Senior 
Manager, Lukoil, Russian, 2001, trans.). 
 
In the early days of post privatisation Lukoil had used a large number of Western consultants 
and, like Yukos, had visited the Western oil companies seeking advice. Training in Western 
management techniques was encouraged and links were also established with Russian 
business schools. With the sale of 7.5% of Lukoil to Conoco-Phillips in 2004 it had been 
agreed that an exchange program would be set up for 20-25 senior managers from each side 
(Senior Manager, Lukoil, Russian, 2004, trans.). Some concern was voiced about the extent 
to which any newly trained managers would be accepted back into suitable positions in the 
organisation. However a manager from head office was of the view that ‘all bright individuals 
who work well….all progress, they are in demand, regardless of their rank (Middle Manager, 
Lukoil, Russian, 2004, trans.). The reality was probably that parts of the organisation (eg 
head office) were much more amenable to young managers with Western training than others 
(eg the regions).  
 
The Soviet style oil companies differed in their approach to learning.  Lukoil was more open 
to Western management skills than Surgutneftegaz, but still lagged far behind the Western 
style companies. Particularly in the case of Surgutneftegaz, and to a lesser extent in Lukoil, 
there was unlikely to be  any  unlearning  of existing routines to enable learning to take place 
since the TMT was unable to envisage major change or to identify and implement radically 
different routines. 
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 Knowledge internalisation in both Yukos and TNK-BP was largely a function of learning by 
doing, for instance by applying the new concepts in business projects.  In the Yukos oilfields 
the expatriate expert would demonstrate calculations to the engineers and convince them that 
they were correct, so they could no longer justify defending their way of doing things: ‘And 
in the end they had to give in, they had to accept that he was right’ (Senior Manager, TNK, ex 
Yukos, Western, 2004). 
 
TNK-BP tried to involve employees in a discussion about the correct approach. For instance,  
when a new system of strategic planning was implemented, the issue was discussed, the 
broad outline taken from the BP approach and then it was ‘learn as you go’: ‘Various people 
got involved and they try to understand what exactly they were supposed to be doing in their 
section of work’ (Senior Manager, TNK-BP, Russian, 2004). 
 
In Yukos there was also a policy of job rotation so that managers could gain experience in 
different environments.  Demonstrable success from the application of Western techniques 
was another key way for specialists to internalise knowledge: ‘If I’m doing it one way and 
you can’t demonstrate to me how ... you’re proposing it’s going to be better, why should I 
change’  (Top Manager, TNK-BP, Regional, Western, 2005).  
 
The different methods of knowledge internalisation in the Western style companies  helped 
employees to overcome the  lack of organisational and technical skills which would enable 
them to apply their knowledge in the different context of the market economy (Swaan, 1997).   
In particular, learning by doing was a way of acquiring some of the tacit knowledge 
associated with these capabilities (Meyer and Møller, 1998). 
 
The regions presented problems for knowledge dissemination for all companies due to 
geographic spread and multiple entities.  Yukos employed 100,000 people who were spread 
over a large geographical area from European Russia and the Baltics to Eastern Siberia. The 
difficulties associated with geographical spread were magnified by the existence of 
organisational silos: ‘One of the features of Yukos is in every function, in every department 
people have a rather narrow perspective’ (Top Manager, Yukos, Western, 2004). One way of 
breaking down these barriers and transferring knowledge was to encourage a culture where 
communication and open discussion became a part of life: ‘If you have a set of common 
goals … and the culture of discussing things, then I think it works towards just trying to work 
out mutual acceptable solutions’ ( Middle Manager, Yukos, Russian, 2004). 
 
In Yukos there was a policy of rotating the directors’ meetings around the different sites. And 
in TNK-BP so-called ‘master classes’ were organised whereby a group of people could visit a 
centre of excellence in one of the regions and people could learn from each other, ‘but it is not 
direct training, but indirect learning, more like professional networking, linked with the 
implementation of innovations’  (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, Russian, 2004, trans.). Change 
agents, such as the ‘Heriot Watters’ in Yukos, were also used to disseminate new ideas in the 
regions.  
 
In TNK-BP six technology working groups were set up based on specific technical projects.  
The Corrosion working group made a case for, and received, $1 billion over five years for a 
corrosion management project (Top Manager, TNK-BP, Western, 2004).  Similar working 
groups were used in functions such as HR and planning.  
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Knowledge dissemination in Yukos and TNK-BP was thus a function of changing cultural 
attitudes to sharing information, breaking down organisational silos, and developing 
communication systems and shared values.   
 
In Lukoil there were various ways of disseminating best practice. Professional skills 
competitions were held in different locations. Around 30 people at a time had the 
opportunity to exchange experiences. Senior management meetings were held every quarter, 
visiting factories, discussing problems, etc., across the different business divisions (Senior 
Manager, Lukoil, Russian, 2004, trans.). Knowledge was also shared via cross functional 
working groups (Middle Manager, Lukoil, Russian, 2004, trans.). However, corporate silos 
were a strong break on knowledge sharing across the company (Middle Manager, Lukoil, 
Russian, 2004). The powerful regional companies – the ‘fiefdoms’ - resisted sharing 
information. The process of knowledge dissemination was therefore likely to be slow and 
painful. 
    
In Surgutneftegaz there was no evidence of knowledge dissemination apart from the 
development and utilisation of the technical knowledge brought back from the USA. 
 
The OL in the Western style companies was exploitation learning (March 1991) since it 
involved refinement, choice, production efficiency, selection, implementation and execution 
in relation to business techniques and processes which were already in existence in Western 
companies.  The Russian oil companies were merely catching up with their Western 
counterparts, developing the threshold operational capabilities for a market economy.  
 
The effect of exploitation learning on the Western style organisations was a significant 
improvement in their operational capabilities. Yukos, in particular, developed many of the 
basic operational capabilities required for success in a market economy, for instance,  HR 
systems, financial controls, PR and investor relations. They made significant advances in 
production, reducing costs and increasing volume of oil production.  Russian competitors 
readily acknowledged that Yukos were ahead of their peers in developing Western 
capabilities: ‘Everyone agrees that they [Yukos] made a significant breakthrough from the 
point of view of establishing a normal …corporation by Western standards’ (Top Manager, 
TNK-BP, Russian, 2004, trans.). TNK had also made significant strides in production 
capability, helped by Western expertise. Two major technological breakthroughs were made 
which substantially increased oil production at very low cost (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, ex 
Yukos, Regional, Russian, 2005, trans.). PR and marketing skills were a key capability that 
TNK developed using the experience of Western educated managers, in particular the CEO, 
Simon Kukes.  A strong retail brand was developed and Western style petrol stations began to 
appear.  
The Soviet style companies had made significantly less progress in developing operational 
capabilities, which was consistent with the reduced level of exploitation learning in these 
companies. The technical skills of Surgutneftegaz were respected by the Western community 
but there was no evidence of the introduction of any Western processes relating to HR, 
finance, marketing, PR or HSE. Lukoil had started to make improvements in many of the 
functional areas, particularly in finance and business planning. However there was little 
evidence of progress in HR and technically they were making slower progress than Yukos.  
Thus in terms of operational capabilities both Surgutneftegaz and Lukoil were laggards 
compared to Yukos and TNK-BP.   
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6.4 Exploration learning and the development of dynamic capabilities 
 
In the Western style companies the increasing experience of the organisations in Western 
systems and processes and the adoption of Western routines further expanded the absorption 
capability of the organisations. The arrival of BP in the new TNK-BP JV in 2003 brought a 
new phase in the development of the absorptive capacity of the old TNK organisation.  The 
large numbers of expatriates and Russian with Western experience contributed to a critical 
mass of knowledge and experience within the organisation.  
 
Having the threshold capabilities for survival in the market economy would not equip the 
companies for sustainable competitive advantage.  For this they would need to develop 
dynamic capabilities, the ability to adapt to changing environments (Teece et al., 1997).  
Exploration learning, characterised by experimentation and innovation, was needed to 
supplement the exploitation learning.   
 
One significant contribution of BP in terms of organisational processes and systems was the 
idea that a looser system of control could be more effective than a strict top down system.  
Establishing boundary conditions and then allowing people the freedom to innovate within 
those conditions was important for exploration learning. In Yukos, too, there was an 
environment which encouraged innovation: ‘Management put absolutely no break, absolutely 
none, on any innovations (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, ex Yukos, Russian, 2004, trans.). 
Employees were encouraged to come up with new ideas and projects. Even mistakes were 
allowable if some learning derived from them. This was very different to the blame culture of 
the Soviet system where knowledge sharing was discouraged (Vlachoutsicos and Lawrence, 
1996).  
 
An example of successful innovation in the field in Yukos was the establishment of a new 
data base which could prioritise wells for maintenance. This innovation was a contributing 
factor to the dramatic growth in oil production. One expatriate in the organisation was, 
however, rather scathing about the innovation capacity of the organisations: ‘There weren’t 
many ideas coming up - creativity and innovation has been killed by the former system (Top 
Manager, Yukos, Western, 2004). Although Yukos fostered innovation, there was some doubt 
about how successful they were at encouraging people to come up with break-through ideas: 
‘That really does just happen at the top’ (Investment Bank, Western, 2001). 
 
Yukos’ predominantly top-down management style imposed restrictions on the ability of the 
organisation to develop dynamic capabilities. There was, however, some evidence that Yukos 
was moving towards greater empowerment. Some employees were trusted and supported: ‘I 
was given total and absolute support’ (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, ex Yukos, Russian, 2004, 
trans.). 
 
Since TNK had lagged Yukos in the development of operational capabilities the main focus of 
TNK-BP was on bringing the company up to Western operating standards. However several 
respondents recognised the considerable innovative potential of Russian managers. This was 
of vital importance given the instability of the environment: ‘People have experience of 
change and they have learnt how to work in times of change’ (Middle Manager, TNK-BP, 
Russian, 2005, trans.). Additionally BP had experience of operating in many different 
countries, adapting to political and social changes. They were also used to  delegate authority 
down through the organisation, enabling decision making at all levels. With the arrival of the 
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knowledge and experience of BP it seemed that exploration learning would be encouraged and 
dynamic capabilities would be developed. Competitive advantage would be a function of  the 
degree to which BP continued to push through changes in terms of empowering the 
organisation and encouraging flexibility: ‘I’ve got try to create capability where they think 
for themselves...A sustainable future is only from trying to unlock that natural capability’ (Top 
Manager, TNK-BP, Western, 2004) 
 
The Western style companies were both at an early stage of exploration learning, but the 
change from the command-and-control management style which had originally prevailed in 
Yukos and TNK was likely to encourage innovation and experimentation throughout the 
organisations. Yukos, though, was already disintegrating in 2004. It seemed likely that TNK-
BP would take over its position of pre-eminence amongst the Russian oil companies.  
 
7. Discussion 
 
The cross-case analysis of what we term the Western style companies (Yukos and TNK/BP) 
have shown that TMTs play a pivotal role in OL processes, and this role varies at different 
stages of enterprise transformation. Top managers who came from outside the organisation 
were able to break the administrative heritage, which was characterised on the one hand by 
rigid hierarchy, lack of innovation, and a blame culture, and on the other by an antipathy to 
Western business methods and lack of focus on profitability. Top managers located outside 
this heritage thus were able to overcome the path dependency and the ‘stickiness’ of the 
historical and administrative heritage. The entrepreneurial approach and diversity of the 
TMTs in the Western style companies meant they had a lower level of investment in the 
prevailing strategy and a lower likelihood of cognitive inertia, thus enabling them to break 
with the administrative heritage. 
 
In the first stage of organisational transformation the TMTs in the Western companies largely 
used a top-down approach to overcome the dominant logic of the organisation.  Acceptance 
of the changes was assisted by the fact that the general characteristic of managers in the 
Soviet planned economy was one of ‘servility and a heads-down mentality’ (Kornai, 1992, p. 
121).  
 
This break with the administrative heritage provided the necessary conditions to initiate OL.  
Without the impetus from a management with radically differing skills and mindsets from the 
dominant logic of the organisation, the organisation would not be capable of absorbing and 
utilising knowledge, simply because that knowledge would not be seen as relevant. In the 
case of Yukos and TNK, with ‘outsider’ managers, the ‘strategic competence’ (Hodgkinson 
and Sparrow, 2002) of the TMT meant that they were aware of the need to adapt to a 
changing environment and they were able to diffuse that understanding down through the 
organisation. This confirms the proposition by Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi and 
Hoskisson (2003) that organisations privatised through sale to strategic investors (‘outsiders’) 
are more likely to have higher learning and absorptive capacity. 
 
In the first stage of OL the emphasis was on exploitation learning or adaptive (survival) 
learning.  This was required to cope with the new conditions of a market economy. 
Operational capabilities already in existence in Western companies were adopted. Both 
Western style companies had developed operational capabilities such as marketing, finance 
and production, although Yukos was more advanced than TNK/TNK-BP. This was not the 
case for the Soviet style companies.  Surgutneftegaz had developed only technical 
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capabilities, rather than business capabilities. There was some evidence of exploitation 
learning and the development of operational capabilities in Lukoil, but the process was 
constrained by the characteristics of the TMT and the predominance of the Soviet 
administrative heritage.  
 
In the second stage of OL there were signs in both Western style organisations of a move 
towards exploration learning.  This was facilitated by a change in the management style of 
the TMT.  In Yukos, the TMT was beginning to mature towards a more democratic style of 
leadership, encouraging innovation, risk-taking and decision-making and fostering a climate 
for exploration learning.  In TNK the process of development of operational capabilities was 
not so far advanced, therefore the focus for the time being remained on bringing the 
organisation up to Western standards.  There was no evidence of exploration learning and the 
development of dynamic capabilities, but many respondents saw rich potential for this as the 
organisation moved into the second stage.  BP brought a more democratic influence to the 
TMT, and BP managers were receptive towards innovation and risk-taking.  
 
Thus, the Western style companies were progressing from exploitation learning to 
exploration learning. Growing experience in Western management techniques acquired via 
exploitation learning had further increased the absorptive capacity of the organisations. They 
were beginning to allow experimentation and development of entirely new capabilities that 
would generate competitive advantage and secure long term survival. Whilst they had not yet 
achieved the balance between exploitation and learning suggested by He and Wong (2004), 
nevertheless prospects had seemed good for this occur. The clash between Yukos and the 
state, with the subsequent partial re-nationalisation of the company brought a sad end to the 
spectacular rise of this company, leaving TNK-BP in the vanguard of change.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We have found that the concept of OL is highly relevant for explaining the process of 
development of organisational capability in transition economies. We also believe that the 
pressure cooker effect of accelerated change due to dramatic changes in the external 
environment and the powerful intervention of the top managers, enables us to derive key 
insights about how large, conservative and bureaucratic companies in the West, anchored in 
their own administrative heritage, could apply exploitation and exploration learning to 
achieve change more rapidly. 
 
This study could usefully be extended by investigating the process of OL in different industry 
sectors in Russia or other countries of the former Soviet Union, which are affected by a 
similar administrative heritage.  Additionally a large-scale survey of privatised companies 
within Russia and the former Soviet Union would provide an interesting quantitative angle to 
the research and contribute to its generalisability.  
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